api-governance

Retrieve a PAST CodeRifts decision by exactly one identifier (case_id | decision_id | fingerprint): full report, breaking changes, scores, and linked receipt metadata if stored. Use this when: - You have a decision_id (or fingerprint) from a previous preflight, PR comment, or CI log and need to inspect or explain that past decision. - You are auditing why a prior ALLOW/WARN/BLOCK was issued. - You are NOT requesting a new analysis of current before/after specs. Do not use when: - You need a decision for the CURRENT uncommitted or PR head change set — call coderifts.preflight_change_set with the current artifacts. - You hold a receipt token and only need cryptographic/lifecycle verification — use coderifts.verify_receipt. - You have no identifier — run preflight first to create one. Inputs: exactly one of case_id, decision_id, or fingerprint. {} → INVALID_INPUT; two identifiers → LOOKUP_IDENTIFIER_CONFLICT; case_id → CASE_NOT_FOUND (lookup never opens a case). Returns the stored document or not_found. Scoping — fingerprint lookup returns only YOUR OWN decisions. A fingerprint is derived from content, not from an account, so two callers who preflight byte-identical specs derive the same one; the lookup is therefore constrained to the decisions your credential can prove it owns. A decision that exists but is not yours returns the SAME not_found as one that was never issued. This is deliberate: a distinguishable "exists but forbidden" would confirm to any caller that a given content hash had been decided on by someone, which is the fact the scoping exists to withhold. Do not read not_found as proof that no such decision exists anywhere. Decisions persisted without context.repository cannot currently be attributed to an account, and are not retrievable by fingerprint at all — not by their owner either. Retrieve those by decision_id, which is unchanged and unscoped. This is a limitation of what older stored rows carry, not a property of the lookup: rows written from now on record the account directly, so the gap narrows as older rows age out. If a fingerprint you expect returns not_found, use the decision_id before concluding the decision is missing. When the stored envelope carries control fields, control_envelope.next_agent_step is structured remediation guidance the agent MAY follow for non-CONTINUE execution_action values (null on CONTINUE*). Still branch on execution_action; next_agent_step is a suggestion, not permission.

Use this when: a contract artifact (OpenAPI, GraphQL, protobuf, AsyncAPI, MCP manifests, or agent tool schemas) changes before merge, deploy, publish, or tool registration; AND any agent-executed operation with no supported contract type — send type agent_operation. Do not call for documentation-only changes, static readiness scoring, or receipt verification. Use analyze for risk only; authorize requires context.operation. Skipping this call is not permission. Absence of a key is not permission. Inputs: preflight_mode is required: "analyze" (risk only; no receipt, no execution_action) or "authorize" (may mint a receipt; requires context.operation — merge is not deploy is not publish). Supply exactly one artifact source: artifacts[] (1–20 items, each {id, type, before, after} as the FULL spec/schema text, not a path or URL; type is openapi|graphql|grpc|asyncapi|mcp_manifest|agent_tools|agent_operation) XOR derivation="server" (server reads GitHub Compare; needs context.repository + context.base + context.head; sending artifacts[] together is 400). Grant fields sit in one object, execution_grant_request {include_execution_grant, grant_version, tenant_id, executor_id, adapter_id, target_uri, expected_state_token, state_nonce, audience, policy_hash}; analyze ignores it; required is preflight_mode only. previous_receipt is a chain token base64url(body).base64url(signature) to LINK a prior decision — it does not re-verify; use coderifts.verify_receipt instead; for details of a past decision use coderifts.get_decision_details instead. idempotency_key replays authorize only (24h), never analyze.

Verify a CodeRifts signed chain-receipt you ALREADY HOLD: cryptographic authenticity (signature + key id), body binding, and — when lifecycle indices are available — whether it is currently valid authorization (not expired, superseded, or revoked) for a stated operation/target. Use this when: - You already obtained a chain_receipt / receipt token from a prior preflight (or CI artifact) and are about to act (merge/deploy) under that receipt. - A contract-gate or policy requires offline/online proof that the receipt is authentic for this change before proceeding. - You must distinguish "signature ok" from "currently authorized" (stale or superseded receipts must not be treated as live approval). Do not use when: - You do not have a receipt yet — call coderifts.preflight_change_set first. - You need a NEW decision for a changed base→head set — preflight again; verify_receipt does not re-diff specs. - The receipt you hold binds a different operation or target than the one you are about to perform — call coderifts.preflight_change_set with context.operation set to that operation (a merge receipt does not authorize a deploy); verify_receipt cannot re-scope or re-issue a decision. - You only need human-readable history of an old decision_id without a receipt token — use coderifts.get_decision_details. - The change set itself is unknown or incomplete — fix the change set and preflight; do not "verify" a placeholder. Inputs: receipt token (required); target_id = decision_result.artifact_digest — required for an authorization verdict; omitted → target_not_stated. Optional intended context (operation, environment, fingerprint, audience, repository/branch/pull_request, base/head) and the body_hash-bound decision_result envelope. 30s clock-skew leeway on expiry. A 0s grace for declared destructive production operations is defined in the policy but is unreachable today: the intended-context schema has no destructive field, so nothing can declare one and the 30s leeway always applies. Returns { valid, status, currently_authorized (bool|null), reason, payload, authz_* }. Branch on currently_authorized; null = not evaluated. When a decision envelope is also in hand (e.g. from a prior preflight), its control_envelope.next_agent_step (if present) is structured remediation guidance the agent MAY follow after a non-CONTINUE decision — still branch on execution_action; next_agent_step is suggestion, not permission.